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February 28, 1991 
I, Introduction 
With the adoption of floating exchange rate systems by major industrialized 
nations, theories of exchange rate determination have been influenced by "asset 
models" in which exchange rates are determined similar to other asset prices. In 
particular, Mussa (1979) showed that fluctuations in exchange rates appear to be 
well described by random walks. That is, the best forecast of a future exchange 
rate is the current rate; actual changes are drawn independently from a 
probability distribution with a zero mean. 1 Any changes, therefore, in exchange 
rates can be viewed as permanent: effects of a shock are not reversed over time. 
The implications of such random walk conclusions for the short run are 
interesting. If shocks are indeed permanent, general belief in existing exchange 
rate models seems unsupported. For instance, a random walk is inconsistent 
with the notion that "overshooting" models and Purchasing Power Parity ("law of 
one price") are a useful guide for long run exchange rate movements.2 
Results in this paper show that applying specific techniques designed to 
analyze long run behavior of time series variables provides evidence that long run 
movements in exchange rates differ from random walks. Long run behavior, for 
both the DM/$ and Y/$ spot rates, exhibit a rather substantial mean reverting 
1 See Hakkio and Pearce (1985) for a brief discussion of Mussa's (1979) findings. See Huizinga (1987) for a 
discussion of Meese and Rogoff's (1983) random walk conclusions. 
2 The "overshooting" notion is a variation of the monetary model. For instance, an unanticipated increase in the 
money supply will cause the exchange rate to fall by an amount greater than required in the long run. Exchange 
rates will then slowly appreciate back towards the long run equilibrium value. In its most simplified form, 
Purchasing Power Parity asserts that nominal exchange rates are determined by the ratio of domestic and foreign 
prices, so that a standardized basket of goods cost the same in both countries. See Baillie and McMahon (1989), 
p221 for an overview of empirical studies. 
1 
component, a temporary component similar to that found in stock prices (Fama 
and French [1988]; Poterba and Summers [1988]).3 That is to say, a diYergence of 
observed market values from fundamental values cannot simply be interpreted as 
support for models of inefficient markets.4 Rather, these divergences may be 
temporary swings away from fundamental values. Over some range, these 
2 
swings are eliminated and values return to their mean. Such temporary swings 
and their subsequent reversion to the mean can be translated into· the statistical j! 
\.... 
hypothesis that exchange rates contain a slowly decaying stationary (OF -. .J I'V 
transitory) component. With such a transitory series, the effects of a given shock 
i 
are reversed over time. 
If nominal exchange rates exhibit mean reverting tendencies (and 
information of this behavior is readily available to market participants), then it 
would seem plausible that expectations of future exchange rates should also differ 
from random walks.S Recently, Frankel and Froot (1987, 1988) provided evidence 
which rejects random walks in expectations offuture spot rates. Using survey 
data of forecasts, they found that short run expectations seem to based on recent 
trends in the spot rate. Such "extrapolative" expectations are different from the 
long run "regressive" ones in which exchange rates are expected to return to an 
equilibrium value such as Purchasing Power Parity. 
Estimating expectations models similar to those used by Frankel and Froot 
(1988), I find that expectations for both the one week and one month horizon seem 
3 Both the Fama and French (1988) and Poterba and Summers (1988) find that over long horizons stock returns 
exhibit mean reverting behavior which is consistent with stock prices containing a stationary component. Though 
the two studies use different statistical methods, both find that variations due to mean reversion can account for a 
part of the return variances for long horizon returns. Using similar tests, Huizinga (1987) detected mean reversion 
in monthly real exchange rates. 
4 For stock prices, one measure of fundamental value is the present discounted value of future di\idends. 
Calculating a "fundamental" value for exchange rates is also subject to different theories such as Interest Rate or 
Purchasing Power Parity. 
S Random walk or static expectations implies that the expected value for a future spot rate is the current spot rate, 
set+ 1 = St, since any changes in the expected value are caused by a random error tenn. 
consistent with what are implied by the actual long run movement in exchange 
rates. Namely, with the long run predictability implied by mean reversion, a 
given appreciation in a currency should lead investors to expect a future 
depreciation, and a given depreciation should lead to an expected appreciation.6 
This contradicts Frankel and Froot's (1988) finding that forecasters tend to 
"extrapolate" recent trends for one week and one month horizons. 
Such a contradiction can be explained once the different sample periods are 
examined. Whereas Frankel and Froot's (1988) data set covered only the period 
between 1984 and 1986, the data used in this paper extend from 1984 through 1989. 
As such, there is no a priori reason to believe that the way in which forecasters 
formed their expectations remained consistent between the two sub-periods, 1984 -
1986 and 1987 - 1989. 
This assertion that the way expectations were formed did not remain 
constant between 1984 and 1989 can be supported if we consider the international 
monetary climate during the mid 1980's. In the wake of the extreme appreciation 
and depreciation of the dollar between 1984 and 1986, finance ministers from the 
G7 publicly committed themselves during their famous Louvre Accord (February 
1987) to stabilize the dollar in order to prevep.t future volatility.? Presumably, such 
public announcements (if believed to be credible) could cause changes in the way 
market participants formed their expectations. Simple Chow tests reveal that, 
indeed, there is no reason to believe that regression coefficients of the expectations 
models remained constant throughout the sample period. 
6 Questions concerning the rationality of this .behavior is not addressed in this paper. For the sake of brevity. 
whether or not the specifications for expectations used in this paper are rational is not a primary focus. These 
expectations mechanisms are only intended to provide a glimpse as to how expectations may be formed. 
Dominguez (1986) rejects rationality in the MMS data set from 1983 through 1985. Tests of rationality for the 
current data set could be a focus for future research. 
7 Actually, the dollar began appreciating as early as 1981. Members of the G7 include the United States, Japan, 




Section II uses Fama and French's (1988) model for stock prices to outline 
an exchange rate model that is composed of a transitory and a permanent 
(random walk) component. This section also shows that standard random walk -
tests may not be able to distinguish between a series composed of a random walk 
and another series composed of a random walk plus a transitory component. 
Section III contains a discussion of the data used. I provide in Section IV results 
which suggest that both the DMI$ and Y/$ spot rates contain a slowly decaying 
transitory component. Section IV also outlines possible explanations for the 
source of temporary components, particularly the implications of coordinated 
exchange rate policy. Section V examines some specifications of the way 
expectations are formed, and whether or not these specifications produce results 
which are consistent with actual movements in exchange rates. I conclude with 
final remarks in Section VI. 
II. Simple Model of Exchanee Rates8 
Long-horizon predictability contradicts empirical findings that movements 
in log exchange rates appear to be well captured by random walks. An accepted 
test of the random walk hypothesis focuses on unit roots in autoregressive 
specifications (i.e., tests for a coefficient of one in an autoregressive process). 
However, as Huizinga (1987) notes, such a "'random-walk' univariate process 
merely indicates that lagged values of the variable itself cannot be used to predict 
future changes." (p.150) Modeling exchange rates in a similar fashion as Fama 
and French (1988) modeled stock prices, it can be shown that if exchange rates 
contain both a transitory and a permanent component, observing unit roots 
cannot be interpreted as supporting a pure random walk hypothesis. 
8 This section draws extensively from Fama and French (1988), pp.248-252. 
4 
7 
Suppose that the spot rate, Stt is composed of a stationary (transitory) 
component, ~t, and a permanent random walk component, 'Vt> with ~t as an AR(l) 
process. 
(1) ~t = P~t-l + l'lt 
(2) 'lit = 'IIt-l + ).l + Et 
where Il is the drift, /p/<l, and Tlt and Et are white noise. We can then let St be a 
weighted average of the random walk and transitory terms: 
Substituting in (1) and (2) into (3), we get 
(4) St = a'llt-l + (l-a)p~t-l + <lEt + (l-a)Tlt + all 
Since Bt-l = <X'Ift_l+(l-a)~t-l' or a'llt-l = St-l - (l-(l~t-l' we can substitute into (4) to get 
(5.a) St = St-l - (l-a)(l-P)~t-l + <lEt + (l-a)Tlt + all, or 
00 
(5.b) St - St-l = <lEt + (l-a)Tlt + (l-a)(p-l)Lpi-lTlt_i + all 
i=l 
Equation (5.a) implies that if exchange rates are composed of both permanent and 
transitory components, the spot rate at time t is equal to the spot rate at time t-l 
plus a collection of white noises and drift. So, in such a series, we should expect to 
observe unit roots: the coefficient from regressing St on St-l should be 
insignificantly different from one. s-.; \-_: ~" , 
If exchang~ :-a;es--conF a transitory component, then mean reverting 
behavior can be 'xpl~ined py. examining the decaying autocorrelation of this 
~ .--/ 
component; If we fet-<i>k be the autocorrelation of the k-period difference in the 
5 
transitory component, i.e., (~t +k- ~t) = <!>It(~t- ~t-k)' then, as Fama and French 
(1988) show, <!>It approaches -ae/2ae, or -1/2, for large k (p.250).9 They note that 
although the transitory component cannot be observed directly, we can infer the 
existence of this term and its properties by regressing (St +k- St) on (St- St-k), where 
a negative coefficient implies mean reversion. If changes in the random walk 
and transitory components are uncorrelated, Fama and French (1988) show that: 
where St is composed of a 
random walk and a transitory 
component as in equations (3) 
through (5), 'Yt is an error term, 
and 
The coefficient, ~k, in (6.b) measures the proportion of the variation in k-period 
difference of exchange rates which is explained by the mean reversion of the 
decaying transitory component, ~t. If exchange rates do not contain a transitory 
component, ~k in (6.a) is equal to zero. On the other hand, if exchange rates 
contain only a transitory component, ~k=<!>It and ~k approaches -1/2 for large k.lO ........::. 
Thus, mean reversion of the transitory portion tends to push ~k towards -V2 
as k increases, while the white noise term in the random walk tends to push it 
towards zero. Fama and French (1988) show that since the variance of the error 
term in the random walk component grows with k, the white noise component 
eventually dominates. This implies that if exchange rates contain both a random 
walk and a transitory component, the coefficient ~k in (6.a) ~Jorm aU-shaped 
pattern as k increases. ", -\ \ ~ 
lj"1.J J 
9 If there is no transitory component, then CPk=O. 




The average of Friday closing bid and offer prices for the DMI$ and VIS spot 
rates are used as proxies for the weekly closing price. This weekly series 
extending from January 1984 through August 1989 was provided by the Federal 
Reserve Bank of Cleveland. Using weekly data captures short run movements 
better than other studies which used monthly or yearly exchange rates; and five 
full years of weekly data covers a longer horizon than other studies which use 
weekly or monthly data for three years (Frankel and Froot [1988]). In addition, the 
series beginning in 1984 includes the extreme appreciation (and the subsequent 
depreciation) of the dollar between 1984 and 1986. If exchange rates do indeed 
contain a transitory component, behavior during this period should contribute to 
the "long" horizon predictability. 1 1 The sample period also coincides with 
increasing investors' perception of the Fed's credibility in maintaining a stable 
monetary growth policy, thus suggesting possible corrective stabilization of 
fluctuations. 12 
Table I contains brief descriptive statistics for weekly percentage changes 
in the Y/$ and DMI$ spot rates. During the sample period, the DMI$ spot rate 
changed, on average, .1273% (in absolute terms) per week: the Y/$, .1745% per 
week. The largest one week appreciation for both the DMI$ and Y/$ spot rates was 
almost equal at 4.159% and 4.693%, respectively. As for the largest one week fall in 
spot rates, the DMI$ witnessed an 8.304% plunge compared to the Y/$'s sharpest 
decline of6.779%. 
11 What is considered as a "long" horizon in this paper may not be acceptable to many who believe that "long 
horizon" entails several decades. Nevertheless. in terms of weeldy movements. five years seems to constitute a 
relative long - if not medium - horizon. 
12 After October 1979. the Federal Reserve emphasized a stable monetary growth target For a discussion see 
Urich and Wachtel (1981). 
7 
Table I 
Descriptive Statistics for Weekly Percentage Changes in ¥/S and DMJ$ Spot Rates 
(January 1984-August 1989) 
Obs. 
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January 1984 through August 1989 
Figure I depicts weekly movements in the DMI$ and Y/$ spot rates. For both 
the Y/$ and DMI$, a clearly observable pattern emerges. From the beginning of 
1984 through early 1985, the DMI$ and Y/$ spot rates increased; the dollar 
appreciated approximately 20% to reach its peak ofDM 3.38 and Y 262 in February 
8 
of 1985. After this, the dollar steadily depreciated and has remained relatively 
stable since early 1987. 
Calculating investors' expectations regarding exchange rates is a difficult 
task. The established method of estimating expectations using forward rates 
poses serious problems. The apparent risk premium contained in forward rates 
creates a gap which separates forward rates from expectations of future spot 
rates. 
Under the assumption of forward market efficiency, expectations of future 
spot rates are assumed to be rational; that is, [EtSt+n/QtJ = [St+n], where EtSt+n is 
the expected spot rate for time t+n based on the information set available at time t, 
Qt. In addition, forward rates are assumed to be unbiased estimators of expected 
future spot rates, i.e., ft,n=[EtSt+n/QtJ, where ft,n is the n- period away forward rate 
at time t. If the forward market efficiency hypothesis were true, the difference 
between ft,n and St+n should have a zero mean and not be serially correlated. 
Therefore, expected changes in exchange rates, as reflected in the forward 
discount (ft - su, should be equal to the actual change (St+l - St). A common test for 
forward market efficiency is to estimate A. in the following regression: 
(7) Bt+l - St = a + A(ft - sJ + <i>t+l 
where St+ 1 is the log of the spot rate 
in t+ 1, ft is the log of the forward 
rate in t, CPt+l is a random error term, 
and efficiency implying a=O, A=1. 
That is, regress the ex post change in the spot rate against the forward discount at 
the beginning of the period. Under the null hypothesis that forward discounts are 
equal to actual changes, the coefficient should be unity. Fama (1984) reports A. 
significantly less than unity. And as he notes, it is recognized that A. different 
from one can result from time varying risk premia in the forward rate (p. 321); for 
9 
instance, coefficient less than one can be interpreted as suggesting that the 
expected appreciation of the dollar as reflected in the forward rate is greater than 
the ex post appreciation of the dollar. 13 
A better measure of expected exchange rates can be obtained through 
surveys of forecasts by market participants. These surveys serve as a proxy for 
expectations without the interference from risk premia. Expectations (forecasts) 
for one week and one month horizons were obtained from Money Market Services 
of Belmont, California. Each week MMS conducts direct phone surveys with 
approximately 30 professional exchange rate forecasters and reports their median 
response. Data on weekly surveys for one week forecasts are available from 
November 1984 through September 1990. Surveys for one month forecasts were 
conducted on a bi-weekly basis from 1984 through the early months of 1985, after 
which they were conducted weekly. 
Survey data on expected exchange rates for longer horizons are available 
from the Financial Report (for three, six, and twelve month horizons) and Amex 
Bank Review (for six and twelve month horizons). Though these data may be 
useful measures of longer-horizon expectations, I use only the MMS data. The 
shortcoming of the other two surveys is the relatively limited number of 
observations. The Amex Bank Review conducted only twelve surveys between 
January 1976 and July 1985: the Financial Report only 38 between June 1981 and 
December 1985.14 
13 Simple efficiency can be outlined as: ft,n=[EtSt+nlntl and [EtSt+nlntJ = [St+n]. A more general outline of 
efficiency is: ft,n=[EtSt+n/Otl + RPt,n and [EtSt+n/nil = [S1+o1, where RPt,n is the risk premium. See Levich 
(1989), p.47. Frankel and Froot (1988) note other studies regressing against forward discounts. There are many 
interpretations of negative estimates of the coefficient in equation (7), one of which is that forward markets are 
inefficient. This paper does not make an attempt to detennine market efficiency or inefficiency. Rather, the point 
of the above discussion was merely to suggest that using forward rates as measures of expectations may be 
inappropriate. Dominguez (1986) notes that since exchange market efficiency does not preclude the existence of a 
risk premium, tests which reject the joint hypOthesis of risk neutrality and rationality do not provide clear 
evidence of efficiency. These results may simply reflect the time varying risk premium. 
14 Frankel and Froot (1987), data notes. 
10 
As noted by Dominguez (1986), the "methodology and respondent sample" 
used to obtain these forecasts "inspire unusual confidence". Respondents are 
professional economists and forecasters with major international institutions 
who have access to minute-by-minute information on all relevant factors. In 
addition, the business careers of these forecasters are dependent on the accuracy 
of the predictions. Criticisms that the survey responses may not be truthful or 
that they do not represent the marginal investor seem less problematic. 
Regardless of the objections raised for using survey data, at the very least, these 
data provide insightful information concerning investors' expectations. IS 
IV at Temporary Components 
A common test of the random walk hypothesis focuses on testing for unit 
roots in an autoregressive process. Using weekly DMI$ and Y/$ spot rates from 
January 1984 through August 1989, I found J3 in the regression 
(8) St = <X + J3st-l + Vt> 
where st is the log of the spot rate 
and Vt is a random error term. 
insignificantly different from unity. The inability to reject the unit root hypothesis 
=J 
in Table II seems to suggest that weekly movements in spot rates are well 
captured by random walks. We saw in Section II. however, that if exchange rates 
are composed of both a transitory and a random walk component, as in equation 
(5.b), we should expect to observe unit roots. 
In general Cochrane (1988) showed that a first difference stationary series 
with a unit root can be interpreted as a series composed of a random walk and a 
15 Investigations by Engel and Frankel (1984), Pearce and Roley (1985) and others suggest that MMS survey data 





St = a + (3St-l + Vt 
Seemingly Unrelated Regression Estimates 16 
Obs. SE t: (3=0 Prob>/t/ 
287 .993 .004 215.389 .0001 
287 .995 .003 307.119 .0001 
• Each currency is given an intercept tenn which is not reported here. Standard errors are 




transitory component. Thus, if exchange rates are modeled as a combination of a 
transitory and a random walk component, as in equation (5.b), the inability to 
reject the unit root hypothesis in equation (8) cannot be interpreted as supporting 
a random walk hypothesis. In such a series, unit root tests can only provide 
information as to whether the series contains a random walk or is composed of a 
random walk plus a transitory component. 
Since error terms of a random walk preocess (i.e., St = St-l + Vt) are assumed 
to be serially uncorrelated, a more direct test of the random walk hypothesis 
involves estimating a in the following regression: 
(9.a) Vt = avt-l + ~t which is equivalent to 
where St is the log of the spot 
rate, ~t is a random error term, 
and a=O if exchange rates follow a 
random walk only. 
16 Estimating coefficients individually using OLS may not be accurate. Because exchange rates are measured 
relative to the U.S. dollar, triple arbitrage opportunities may cause cross-correlation in the error terms of the 
regression. Zellner's (1962) "seemingly unrelated regression" technique .... ill improve the precision of the 
estimates. 
12 





(St - St-l) = a + a(st-l - St-2) + 0t 
Seemingly Unrelated Regression Results. 
Obs. a SE t: ~=O 
286 .009 .046 .204 
286 .081 .047 1.71* 
• He: Random Walk, a=O . 
•• Each currency given an intercept tenn which is not reported here. 




These results suggest, particularly for the Y/$ spot rate, that exchange rates 
contain more than a pure random walk component. We can, at 5% significance, 
reject the null that the Y/$ spot rate follows a random walk only. Evidence for the 
DMI$ is not as convincing. Implied in Table III is that the Y/$ spot rate contains a 
larger temporary component, whereas the DMI$ spot rate seems to be explained 
more by a permanent component, with the temporary portion having little 
influence, if any at all. 
It may be evident by now that equation (9.b) is a special case of equation (6.a), 
(St +k- St) = f3k(st;- St-k) + 'Yt, the k difference autocorrelation, with a=f3k and k=1. 
Thus, testing the hypothesis that random walks have uncorrelated error terms is 
qualitatively equivalent to testing for the existence of a mean-reverting, transitory 
component at the one week horizon. Results in Table III indicate that, at the one 
week interval, the Y/$ spot rate contains a temporary component which has not 
begun to revert to a mean. Though we cannot reject the hypothesis that error 
terms for the DMI$ spot rate are uncorrelated, we cannot conclude from this that 
13 
14 
the DMI$ spot rate does not contain a transitory component. Based on equations 
(6.a) and (9.b) all we can say is that the transitory component of the DMIS spot rate 
does not seem to be detectable at the one week horizon. If a temporary component 
exists, it may be detectable over longer intervals. 
Table IV 
~ J'tV' 
t/' .' (0 \I ...  , '1' v I 
, II 'f ., (:''; . 
t·h,I.I( (I \ Seemingly Unrelated Regression Estimates of Equation (6.a) 
(St +k- St) = (l + Pk(SC St-k) + 'Yt 
1 7, YEN/$ 
V 
k Obs Pk SE DW Pk 
(Wks) 
-~) 286 .081 () .047* 2.038 r .009 
8 271 .089 f'. .047* .177 .005 '" 
16 256 .172 .052** .087 .109 
20 248 .096 -., .053* .068 .078 
26 236 .045 .054 .047 .045 
28 232 .018 .054 .044 .014 
30 228 -.015 .053 .038 -.019 
32 224 -.058 .053 .038 -.053 
34 220 -.111 .653** .033 -.086 
36 216 -.174 .052** .029 -.126 
38 212 -.241 .051 ** .026 -.167 
40 208 -.307 .049** .029 -.211 
42 204 -.381 .047** .028 -.260 
44 200 -.457 .045** .026 -.314 
46 196 -.516 .044** .022 -.364 
• Each currency given an intercept teon which is not reported. 
* Significant at the 5% (one-tailed) level. 



















Table IV shows estimates of Pk in the regression (St +k- St) = Pk(SC St-k) + 'Yt, 
for k={l, 8, 16,20,26,28,30,32,34,36,38,40,42,44, 46}, for both the Y/$ and DMI$ 
spot rates. The estimates are plotted in Figure II. The results show negative 
auto correlations in long-horizon differences of spot rates. These data indicate that 
v" ~ 
A \,r. 
both the Y/$ and DMI$ spot rates begin to exhibit mean reverting beha,ior around 
the 30 week interval. 
~ 
Figure II: Seemingly Unrelated Estimates of 
k-Difference Autocorrelations 
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As hypothesized, the negative autocorrelations continue to decrease as the 
time horizon is lengthened. After 46 weeks, the transitory component of the Y/S 
and DMI$ spot rates accounts for approximately 50% and 36% of the variation in 
exchange rates, respectively. These estimates support the above evidence from 
Table TIl which suggests that the DMI$ spot rate contains a smaller transitory 
component than the Y/$ rate at the one week horizon; or similarly, the mean 
reversion of the DMI$ spot rate is smaller than that of the Y/$ spot rate at a given 
time. After 40 weeks, for example, the transitory component accounts for 30% of 
15 
the variation in the Y/$ exchange rate, while for the DMJ$ rate, the transitory 
component explains 20% of the variation. I7 
As the coefficients continue to decline over longer horizons, the standard 
errors become relatively small, and t-values increase. T -values near the early 
stages of mean reversion (k=26-34), on the other hand, are quite small. 
Interpretation of the regression coefficients for these shorter horizons is 
16 
\lJ~ 
~ti~allurohlematic. However, as ~uizi.nga (1987) note~: .) .'j 
rv./ttrV .. (M. I~ wt 'ttf ~,!:n Lrl ({ , i (. /J.h.: .( .. "( ... ~ 
While the magnitude of these de~iatfons froth random~w~ behavior is 
obviously large in an economic sense, it is not significant in a statistical 
sense. Someone with strong a priori information that real exchange rates 
are random walks need not be persuaded otherwise by the data. Nonetheless, 
those who look to the data to obtain a reasonable "best guess" are unlikely 
to select a random-walk specification to describe long-run behavior of real 
exchange rates (p.186). 
IV. h. Sources of Temporary Components 
The assertion that foreign exchange rates may contain a transitory 
component can be motivated intuitively by considering, for example, monetary 
policies of the Federal Reserve. In October of 1979 the Fed reaffirmed its 
commitment to a stable monetary policy. _Subsequent perception of the Fed's 
credibility could have led market participants to expect the Fed to correct any 
deviations of the money supply froni its expected growth target. For instance, if 
the money supply announcement were greater than the expected level, the 
anticipation of future tightening would cause an increase in the current interest 
rate, and these higher interest rates would lead to an increase in the demand for 
dollar denominated assets, thus causing an appreciation of the dollar. Similarly, 
if the commitment of other public and private actions designed to prevent extreme 
17 See Appendix A for OLS estimates. 
,. 
'\ olatility of currencies were also perceived as credible, market participants would 
expect a certain level of stability in the long run. This intuitive outline rooted in 
monetarist theories is by no means exhaustive; nevertheless, given investors' 
expectation of these various intervention policies, it would not be surprising to 
discover temporary movements in exchange rates. 
Interpreting the predictability of long-horizon movements in asset prices 
caused by a transitory component is subject to two competing economic 
explanations. Implied temporary swings away from fundamental values can be 
interpreted as supporting an inefficient market hypothesis (or as a rejection of the 
equilibrium asset pricing models). On the other hand, the presence of such 
behavior could also result from time-varying risk factors, in which case the 
swings constitute variations in equilibrium expected values. I8 
Another possible suggestion can be found in the stock market literature. 
Recently, De Long, Shleifer, Summers, and Waldman (1990) showed that the 
existence of transitory components in stock prices can be explained if market 
participants are either sophisticated investors (Le., those who use fundamental 
analysis) or noise traders. DSSW argued that with the un~<4.£tab~~ure ~! 
noise traders' misconceptions of fundamental values, noise traders may be 
compensated for bearing the additional risk which they themselves create; thus, 
in arbitraging to exploit noise traders' opinions, sophisticated investors must 
bear the additional risk that misconceptions will become even more extreme. If 
noise traders' misconceptions are serially correlated, sophisticated investors will 
not be willing to bet as heavily against noise traders. If we assume that some 
market participants are passive (not responding to noise or betting against noise 
18 Fama and French (1988) provide an intuitive explanation of how these opposite positions can imply similar 
predictability in stock prices. A formal discussion can be found in Summers and Poterba (1988). 
17 
trades), the temporary nature of the noise traders' errors can cause asset prices 
to deviate temporarily from fundamental values. 
Yet another cause of temporary fluctuations in exchange rates may be 
found by considering coordinated exchange rate policies between countries. The 
extreme volatility of exchange rates, since floating regimes were implemented in 
1973, led monetary authorities to coordinate attempts to stabilize currencies. 
Unlike the stock market, exchange rate markets can be influenced directly by 
coordinated policy intervention. 
Concerned with increasing U.S. external trade deficits and the ballooning 
dollar during the mid 1980's, finance ministers of the G5 agreed during their 
famous Plaza meeting in February 1985 to pursue direct intervention in order to 
drive the dollar lower. 19 Other well publicized accords aimed at stabilizing 
exchange rates include the Baker-Miyazawa Pact of 1986 and the Louvre Accord 
in February 1987. The purpose of these meetings, ostensibly, was to obtain 
commitments to coordinate intervention policies in order to stabilize exchange 
rates. Commitments alone, however, do not stabilize exchange markets. 
If a shock causes the demand for dollars to fall, we could observe an 
appreciation of the Y and the DM, as investors shift their demand from dollar 
denominated assets into Y and DM denominated assets. The commitment of 
intervention by central monetary organizations to support the dollar from any 
additional depreciation could result in the dollar taking only a temporary swing. 
Similarly, an increase in demand for dollars, followed by intervention to bring the 
dollar back down, would also result in only a temporary fluctuation. The 
existence of temporary movements, then, depends to a certain degree on the extent 
and effectiveness of intervention. 
19 Whether or not the subsequent depreciation of the dollar would have occurred regardless of the G5 intervention 
is questionable. The G5 includes the United states, Gennany (then West Gennany), France, Japan and Britain. 
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As the evidence in Table III and IV suggests, the Y/$ spot rate seems to 
contain a larger temporary component than the DMI$. This empirical observation 
can be supported by considering the institutional structure which anchors the D:-'l 
- the European Monetary System. One of the main goals of the EMS is to limit 
exchange rate volatility between member countries, with the German DM serving 
as the anchor currency. Prior to the Basle-Nyborg meetings in September 1987, 
intervention was obligatory when an EMS member currency reached the 2.25% 
margin around the EMS valuated exchange rate. Unlike this "red-light" 
intervention, West Germany agreed, after September 1987, to finance "orange-
light" interventions before a currency reached its ceiling or floor rate; that is, 
Germany was readily willing to intervene in matters concerning EMS 
members.20 
If the Y and DM appreciate as investors shift their demand from dollar 
denominated assets to DM and Y denominated assets, the Y/$ and DMI$ spot rates 
will fall. To maintain stability of the dollar, intervention from the Bank of Japan 
would support the dollar and drive the Y/$ spot rate back to a more appropriate 
level. Before West Germany can intervene to strengthen the dollar, however, its 
important position in the EMS warrants priority attention. The appreciation of 
19 
the DM against the French franc, for example, could cause the Bundesbank to 
It.~ 
intervene by purchasing French francs in".?J;de~!'[g.e DM/f.fr r3~~~<" U' ~ ... 
the prescribed EMS margin. As a result, GermanYJi'DM holdings would fall 
while its Ffr reserves would rise. This m~em-e-nt1n the domestic DM supply 
could cause interest rates in Germany to riLe.21 These 1ff.ph~r interests rates 
'iJ ptrJ'i 
20 "A long Road to Reform," The Economist, March 26, 1988, p.86. 
21 Another possibility is that Germany could Sell DM, in which case the domestic money supply would increase, 
and its interest rates fall. However, it was well known in the 1980's that the Bundesbank was reluctant to gamble 
because of its inflationary anxiety. This anxiety caused the Bundesbank to be reluctant to sell DM. See "Francly 
Speaking," The Economist, January 10, 1987, p.66. 
would then lead to increased demand for DM denominated assets, thus keeping 
the DM strong. 
A possible implication, then, is that because of Germany's priority position 
'within the EMS, the Bundesbank may be slower to react directly in the DMiS 
market. This seems to suggest that a positive shock to the DM caused by investors 
shifting their demand from dollars to DMs will only be augmented by Germany's 
efforts to maintain EMS parities. The delayed intervention to maintain dollar 
stability may result in temporary shocks to the DMI$ exchange rate which take 
longer to return to fundamentallevels.22 
Directly obtaining empirical evidence which supports this hypothesis is 
quite difficult. Central monetary authorities are hesitant to provide details 
concerning the number and size of direct interventions. News from the financial 
grapevine, however, may provide some insight. As the dollar kept depreciating in 
1987, stories spread that the Secretary of Treasury, James Baker 3d, continued to 
urge Japan and West Germany to stimulate their domestic demand. At the April 
1987 meeting in Washington of the G7 finance ministers, Kiichi Miyazawa, 
Japan's Minister of Finance, presented stimulative fiscal measures for Japan. 
Vlest German's finance minister, Gerhard Stoltenberg, did not.23 Later in 1987, 
Baker was reported to have criticized the Germans for not lowering their interest 
rates. 
When the dollar recovered in 1989 and seemed to be appreciating too 
quickly, the Germans did not freely intervene to put depreciating pressures on the 
dollar. A Wall Street Journal article quotes an economist from Salomon as 
saying, "Whenever the market has put the most pressure on the Bundesbank to 
22 That is to say, ~k in equation (6.b) - the proportion of the variation of the k-period difference in exchange rates 
which is explained by the mean reversion of the decaying transitory component - will be smaller for the DM/$ 
spot rate than the ¥!$ spot rate, as was reported in Table IV. 
23 "On the Skids," The Economist, April 18, 1989, p.76. 
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tighten, it has resisted."24 The Germans were reluctant to raise domestic interest 
rates to help depreciate the dollar. 
Intervention by the Japanese, on the other hand, seems to have been more 
direct and aggressive. During 1987, though central banks from various nations 
intervened in exchange markets to assist in pegging-up the depreciating dollar, 
"The Japanese [were] clearly at the forefront of the currency battle ... Japan 
seemed to be the only country making a genuine effort. "25 These comments from 
the financial press are intended to serve only as a brief glance into the 
complexities involved in exchange rate policy coordination. They merely provide 
insights into one possible suggestion as to how a delayed response from central 
monetary authorities could lead to a slower correction of temporary swings in 
exchange rates. 
Vt at Exchang'e Rate Expectations 
Given that transitory components cause exchange rates to exhibit mean 
reverting behavior, how are expectations of future spot rates influenced by this 
temporary swing? Specifically, are expectations consistent with the behavior 
implied in the long horizon movement of exchange rates? If investors expect 
exchange rates to revert to a mean, it seems intuitive that a past appreciation of a 
currency leads investors to expect a future depreciation, and vice versa.26 This 
final section of the paper examines some of the different specifications of 
expectations. These mechanisms are intended to provide only a picture of possible 
specifications most likely to be used in forming expectations. 
24 "Dollar gains continue despite intervention," (Foreign Exchange) (column) by Michael Sesit il28 col in. Wall 
Street Journal, September 6, 1989. pC I. 
21 
25 "Japan resigns itself to dollar's weakness; central bank concentrates on steadying the fall. "(International 
News) by Kathryn Graven. Wall Street Journal. December 2. 1987. p.24. f"" tP, 
26 The key assumption is that they expect no changes in fundamentals. JJ..P ~ 
~ () I "l/V ,v.A1t" it..i- ., 
~l\l" C) C,), t t,~( 
~. t" 
Using forecasts from the Financial Report, Amex Bank Review, and MMS 
for various horizons, Frankel and Froot (1987, 1988) examine different 
specifications for how expectations are formed. The general framework begins 
with the assumption that the expected future spot rate is a weighted average of the 
contemporaneous spot rate, Stl and other factors, Xt: 
where St is the log of the 
spot rate and set+n is the log 
of the expected future spot 
rate for t+n at t. 
Examining the weight investors (survey respondents) place on the other factors 
allows us to distinguish how expectations are formed. The null that expectations 
are random walks, or static, is /3=0. The task is then to examine different 
candidates for the other factors, Xt. 
v. b. Extrapolative Expectations 
Suppose, for simplicity, that expectations are formed as a distributive lag, 
with investors assigning a weight of co to the lagged spot rate and a weight of (I-co) 
to the current spot rate: 
(11) set+1 = (l-co)st + COSt-l 
where St is the log of the 
spot rate and set+1 is the 
expected future spot rate 
for t+1 at time t. 
If we subtract the current spot rate from both sides, we get the expected 
depreciation (appreciation) of the spot rate as proportional to the current change 
in the spot rate: 
22 
(12.a) Set+l - St = - WSt + WSt-b or \) 
(12.b) ~Set+l = - W~St :::- 6{ 5.t ~ 
I 
Frankel and Froot term this model "extrapolative expectations". If investors 
extrapolate the most recent trend (i.e., 0><0), then they exhibit "bandwagon 
expectations". If, for example, a currency has recently appreciated, investors 
would expect the appreciation to continue and they would increase their demand 
for the currency; similarly, if a depreciation of the currency has recently occurred, 
future depreciation would be expected. This type of extrapolation of recent trends 
seems to be consistent with the chartists perspective (investors who project trends 
from charts). 
Then, if chartists were to dominate foreign exchange markets, the 
bandwagon effects would make the markets somewhat de-stabilizing. Frankel 
and Froot (1990) note that during the 1980's a move was made away from 
fundamental analysis to more technical or chartists methods by many of the 
leading institutions involved in exchange rate trading. Balancing this de-
stabilizing influence, however, is the transitory component in exchange rates. If 
investors are aware of the mean reverting behavior of exchange rates, then their 
chartists tendencies may be suspended. 
Table V reports SUR estimates of the coefficient in equation (12.b), the 
extrapolative expectations equation. These results seem to contradict Frankel and 
Froot's (1988) finding that short term expectations exhibit bandwagon tendencies. 
i e• 
Their estimates from using the MMS one week and one month forecasts indicate 
that given a 10% appreciation, th~ spot rate is expected~preciate an additional 
1.35% and .54% over the next one week and one month, respectively. 
23 
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Table V depicts a different scenario. One week expectations for both the V/$ 
and DMIS spot rates are "stabilizing" and are significant at the 5% and 7.5% levels, 
respectively; since the spot rates are in logarithmic form, a 10% appreciation 
Table V 
Extrapolative Expectations Model 
Independent Variables: St-St-l 
SUR regressions of: set+1 - St = ex - m(st - St-I) 
Spot Rate Forecast Dates 00 t: (J):::() DW 
DM/$ 
¥/$ 
f l 'I -: -I '. Ii, 1-, <-I'. v,.) .. 'J' r' 
I . 
ttS 5'~ /jt~ ' '{ 
5t;· ~ bt ? J 11 (j.~ 
One Week l In /84-8/2/89 .081 
(.049) 
1.626* L511 
One Month lIn /84-8/2/89 
One Week lIn /84-8/2/89 










• Ho: Random Walk or Static Expectations, 00=0. HI: Non-Bandwagon, 00>0 . 
•• Standard errors are reported in parentheses. Each currency given an intercept term 
which is not reported. 
* Significant at approximately the 7.5% (one-tailed) level. 




of the DM/$ spot rate over the past week leads to an expected depreciation of .81% 
for the following week. Similarly, a 10% appreciation in the V/$ spot rate will lead 
to an expected depreciation of .69% in the next seven days.27 In contrast to the one 
27 Since exchange rates seem to exhibit mean reversion around 30 weeks, it may seem odd that expectations for one 
week are not extrapolative. One interpretation of the bandwagon tendency reported by Frankel and Froot is that 
investors anticipate mean reversion sometime in the far future. It can be interpreted that, as long as /00/<1, the 
extrapolative model of expectations is not de-stabilizing. The fact that the absolute value of the coefficient is less 
week expectations, results of extrapolative expectations for the one month horizon 
do not provide conclusive evidence. The estimates are not at all significant. The 
extrapolative expectations model does not seem to adequately portray expectations 
for longer horizons.28 
The discrepancy in estimates for the one week extrapolative model can be 
explained if we consider the two different sample periods. Expectations data used 
by Frankel and Froot (1988) covered the dollar's alleged "bubble" path between 
June 1984 and February 1986.29 In 1984, the dollar began its steady and consistent 
appreciation; the mood of the market may have been similar to Schiller's "fads" 
model. At any moment during this period, the chartists' techniques or technical 
analysis would have predicted continued appreciation. Seeing the rest of the 
market profit from speculating on the dollar's appreciation would have lured 
many to join the "bandwagon".30 The dollar reached its peak in February of 1985 
and began its steady fall; ,this subsequent period of depreciation could have 
provided another foundation for speculative, ban~wagon expectations. It seems, 
then, that the bandwagon tendencies observed by Frankel and Froot (1988) can be 
explained, to a certain extent, by the speculative character of their sample period. 
The expectations data used in this paper extend well beyond the volatile mid 
1980's and into the era of international exchange rate coordination. As the dollar 
continued its depreciation, finance ministers from the leading industrialized 
countries began discussing ways to curb excessive volatility within exchange 
markets. As discussed earlier, two important meetings in November 1986 and 
than unity implies a slowly decaying influence of a previous trend; for example, if a 10% appreciation in the past 
week leads investors to "extrapolate" a less than 10%, say 3%, appreciation for the following week. then this 
suggests that investors expect the current trend to continue, but not to the same extent. 
28 We must note that mean reversion in exchange rates around 30 weeks does not imply similar behavior in 
forecasters' expectations. Forecasts are affected by factors other than that which can be measured in time series 
analysis. Thus, it is not inconsistent to have mean reversion in exchange rates at long horizons and also to have 
forecasters expect "mean reversion" to occur as quickly as a week. 
29 Frankel and Froat (1988) provides a discussion of both rational and irrational bubbles. 
30 Levich (1989) cites studies which conclude that investors could profit from such "filter" techniques (p.44). 
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February 1987 arguably seemed to signal the end of excessive volatility such as the 
alleged "bubble" path of the mid 1980's. In November 1986, Treasury Secretary 
Baker met with Japan's Finance Minister, Miyazawa; they agreed that the dollar 
had fallen enough and that future concerns should focus on stability. This 
position was reiterated during the Louvre Accord in February 1987. Agreeing that 
the dollar had fallen to a more fundamental level, the finance minsters of the G7 
publicly committed themselves to helping stabilize exchange markets. 
Understandably, if investors believed these commitments to be credible, 
speculating on another swing of the dollar similar to that of the mid 1980's would 
not have been perceived as profitable. Swings in exchange rates would be short 
lived. In such a market, participants would be unlikely to bet that trends would 
continue without intervention from monetary authorities. The profitable strategy, 
then, would seem to be the one which speculates against recent trends. Thus, the 
credibility of the various monetary authorities to maintain a stable dollar may 
have influenced the way in which short term expectations were formed. 








... Significant at the 5% leve1. 
...... Significant at the 1 % level. 
F¥mth 
8.04** 
specification did not remain constant throughout the two sample periods, a Chow 
test was performed by dividing the data set into two sub-periods: the approximate 
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period covered by the Frankel and Froot data set (1984 through 1986), and the 
period between 1987 through 1989. Results in Table VI indicate that coefficients 
for extrapolative expectations were not constant through the two sub-periods. 
Y, c, Regressiye Expectations 
We have seen evidence which suggests that mean reversion in nominal 
exchange rates occur at relatively long horizons. Naturally, the next step is to 
examine how expectations are formed relative to long horizon movements in spot 
rates. Again, the specification for such an expectations model can be in Frankel 
and Froot's (1988) study. Using the longer horizon forecasts provided by Amex 
Bank Review and the Financial Report, Frankel and Froot (1988) found that 
expectations for these horizons exhibited a regressive tendency. That is to say, 
over time investors expected exchange rates to move towards a long-run 
equilibrium level, s* t. Frankel and Froot (1988) assumed that expected spot rates 
were a weighted average of the current spot rate and a long-run equilibrium rate 
(defined in terms of fundamental notions such as PPP): 
where S*l is a long-run equilibrium exchange 
rate)l 
Re-arranging, we get the following in terms of expected depreciation: 
31 s* t = So + log (P I P* ), where So is the log of the average nominal value of the foreign exchange currency in 
tenns of dollars, 1973 - 1979, and P is the domestic ratio of the current CPI to the average CPI for 1973-1979 and 
p* is the foreign ratio of the current ratio of the current CPI to the average CPI for 1973-1979. 
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If8 >0, the spot rate is expected to move towards s*t. If8 <0 the expected 
spot rate moves away from the long-run equilibrium. Frankel and Froot's results 
shed more light on exchange rate behavior. Their specification, however, for the 
equilibrium rate seems inappropriate. Their long run equilibrium is calculated 
using PPP for 1973 through 1979. To use this value as a proxy for the long run 
equilibrium rate during the 1980's is questionable. Presumably, the early period of 
floating exchange rate regimes was affected by factors driving PPP, such as the 
selection of appropriate price indices, etc., which were completely different in the 
1980's. There is no reason to believe that factors such as relative prices between 
countries remained constant over the two time periods. 
Since we are interested in how expectations are formed in light of mean 
reversion, a simple but effective model would be to test if investors expect 
exchange rates to return to their mean. Given the large number of observations 
(288 weeks), the sample mean should be a good proxy for the true mean (the 
possibility that the true mean may not have been constant throughout the sample 
period is addressed below). Suppose then, that expected future spot rates are a 
function of the contemporaneous spot rate and the mean spot rate. If we replace 
s* in equation (14) with the sample mean, Sm, then 8 measure the speed at which 
the spot rate is expected to move towards the mean (This specification will be 
termed Mean Regressing Expectations.) If 8>0 the spot rate is expected to move 
towards the mean. Verifying this hypothesis would be consistent with mean 
reversion; namely, if exchange rates are currently above the long run average, 
then investor's who expect mean reversion would anticipate future exchange 
rates to fall towards the mean. Table VII reports estimates of 8. 
Expectations for longer horizons should be better explained by 
specifications which take into consideration current spot rate movements relative 
to a "long run equilibrium". ResUlts in Table VII seem to support this notion. 
Table VII 
Mean Regressive Expectations 
Independent Variables: SCSm 
SUR regressions of: Set+l - St = a - 8(st - sm) 
Spot Rate Forecast Dates 8 t: 8=0 
DM/$ 
One Week lIn /84-8/2/89 .0067 1.570* 
(.0043) 
One Month l In /84-8/2/89 .0278 5.277** 
(.0052) 
¥/$ 
One Week l In /84-8/2/89 .0036 1.315 
(.0027) 
One Month 11n /84-8/2/89 .0175 3.688** 
(.0047) 
• Ho: Random Walk or Static Expectations, 9=0. HI: Mean Regressive, 9>0 . 
• Standard errors are reported in parentheses. Each currency is given an intercept 
term which is not reported. 
* Significant at the 5% (one-tailed) level. 






Not only are the coefficients for the one month forecasts larger than the 
coefficients for the one week forecasts, but they are more significant. As we can 
see from Table VII, exchange rates are expected to move toward their sample 
mean. If the current DMI$ spot rate is 10% above its mean, forecasters expect it to 
fall .28% towards the sample mean over the next month. 
Of course, using the mean for the entire sample in the independent variable 
may not be appropriate, since it is possible that the true mean varies over time. In 
our data sample, two distinct periods become obvious: the large swing in the dollar 
between 1984 and 1986, and the subsequent rather stable period between 1987 and 
1989. Though the true mean and its innovations cannot be observed, if a change in 
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the mean actually occurred, these two periods may provide some insight. I 
estimated the Mean Regressing Expectations for these two period using their 
respective sample means. Table VIII reports the Chow test results. 
Table VIII 
Chow F Statistics 
FDMwk 
5.02* 9.83** 
* Significant at the 5% level. 
** Significant at the 1 % level. 
FDMmth 
9.72** 4.12* 
These critical F values allow us to reject the null that coefficients on the Mean 
Regressing Expectations model remained constant throughout the two different 
periods. 
VI. Conclusions 
Using a similar technique that Fama and French (1988) applied to stock 
prices, this paper focused on the long run predictability of nominal exchange 
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rates. Both the theoretical and empirical results su%gest that accepted tests of ! 
random walks cannot be simply accepted. Ratherf,~~~t";~srieem to be positively · l 
I ~ 
correlated over short horizons (up to around thirty weeks) and negatively 
correlated over long intervals. This behavior is consistent with the statistical 
hypothesis that exchange rates contain a slowly decaying stationary component. 
The negative auto correlations over long intervals are caused by the mean 
reversion of this temporary component. 
In addition, the results in Section V (based on data for 1984 through 1989) 
indicate that standard methods of specifying expectations produce estimates 
which are consistent with the mean reversion in exchange rates; a past 
appreciation leads to an expected depreciation, and vice versa. As with many 
empirical studies, however, this paper raises additional questions. Particularly, 
the consistency of expectations with mean reversion of exchange rates contradicts 
Frankel and Froot's (1988) finding (based on data for 1984 through 1886) that one 
week and one month expectations are formed extrapolatively based on recent 
trends. 
The hypothesis which naturally stems from such a contradiction is that we 
have no reason to believe expectations remained constant throughout the different 
sample periods. Specifically, the shift to international exchange rate coordination 
in 1986-1987 seems to provide an extremely plausible juncture at which 
expectations may have been altered. Within such a context, it should not be 
surprising that Frankel and Froot (1988) observed "bandwagon" tendencies; their 
sample period coincided with the ballooning roller coaster ride of the dollar 
during the mid 1980's. The data used in this paper extend well beyond this volatile 
period into the relatively stable years of international exchange rate coordination. 
Such a policy shift in 1986-1987 could arguably have had an affect on the way in 
which expectations were formed. Simple Chow tests support the hypothesis that 
regression coefficients of expectations models did not remain constant throughout 
the two sample periods, 1984-1986 and 1987-1989. 
, , 
To the outsider, the foreign exchange market is imagined as a face~paced, 
high-tech, high-power playground where the wealth of men in red susp~nders are 
made (and lost) based on the latest piece of information flashing across electronic 
boards. Predicting long run movements in such a market may seem like an 
impossible task. The fact that major international financial institutions are 
31 
willing to support their exchange rate traders with millions of dollars in such an 
unpredictable environment may shock the un-initiated. However, results in this 
paper suggest that long horizon movements in exchange rates may be less risky 
than what are implied by extrapolating short run trends; and in addition to 
statistical tests on actual spot rate fluctuations, forecasts by leading institutional 
participants seem to support this notion of predictability in the long run. 
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APPENDIX A 
Results in Table IV were estimated using Seemingly Unrelated 
Regressions. Using monthly stock returns, Fama and French (1988) estimate the 
same equations, but with OLS. Huizinga (1987) used OLS on monthly real 
exchange rates. This appendix reports estimates of the k-difference 
autocorrelations using OLS. In order to avoid the biases in OLS estimates, Fama 
and French (1988) constructed simulations to estimate bias adjustments. They 
report that when stock prices have stationary components which produce negative 
autocorrelations, the simulations generate estimates which are similar to OLS 
estimates. OLS seems to have little bias. 
OLS Estimates of Equation (6.a) 
(St +k- St) = (X + ~k(St- St-k) + 'Yt 
YEN/$ 
k Obs ~k SE DW ~k 
(Wks) 
1 286 .067 .059 2.010 .045 
8 272 .152 .061** .190 .128 
16 256 .220 .064** .091 .294 
20 248 .201 .066** .075 .291 
26 236 .213 .065** .056 .286 
~232 ____ .209 .065** .054-- .266 
30 228 .T72--- -.O(iS** .047 .231 
32 224 .115 .065* .046 .188 
34 220 .056 .064 .038 .157 
36 216 -.007 .064 .032 .128 
38 212 -.086 .063 .029 .088 
40 208 -.167 .062** .033 .043 
42 204 -.245 .062** .031 -.015 
44 200 -.319 .061** .028 -.073 
46 196 -.370 .060** .023 -.120 
• Each currency given an intercept tenn which is not reported. 
* Significant at the 5% (one-tailed) level. 
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Qualitatively, the above results are similar to those in Table IV. The Y/$ 
spot rate seems to contain a larger temporary component. The autocorrelations 
for the Y/$ become negative around the 36 week horizon, whereas the DMI$ begins 
to revert to the mean around the 42 week interval (Using SUR, the coefficients 
became negative at the 30 week horizon.) This suggests that the Y/$ reverts to the 
mean earlier than the DMI$. At the 42 week horizon, for example, mean reversion 
in the Y/$ transitory component accounts for approximately 24% of the variation 
in the spot rate; the transitory component for the DMI$ accounts for much less at 
.15% of the variation in the spot rate. 
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